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Abstract 
The European Parliament enjoys an array of powers in development cooperation, ranging from 
legislative and budgetary powers to scrutiny and democratic oversight. However, its role has 
largely been overlooked and generally been absent from the key debates in the EU foreign 
policy literature. Partly this stems from the ‘low politics’ nature of development cooperation, 
when set against the ‘high politics’ of EU external relations as typified by CFSP/CSDP and 
trade. This article combines a legal analysis of the EP’s post-Lisbon powers in EU development 
cooperation with an examination of the Multiannual Financial Framework, European 
Consensus on Development and interinstitutional interactions to assess how the EP has 
succeeded in gaining a more significant role in this policy field. The article argues that the ‘low 
politics’ of EU development cooperation is highly susceptible to the EP’s institutional assertion 
and empowerment in overall EU external relations. 
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) takes pride in its position as a major donor of development aid and 
agenda-setter in global development cooperation. A direct connection is often made in the 
official discourse of EU institutions between the Union’s core values, as defined in Article 2 
of the Treaty on European Union,i and the rationale for supporting development overseas. Since 
one of the core values in the Treaty is ‘democracy’, it is perhaps surprising that it is only 
recently that the sole directly elected institution of the EU, the European Parliament (EP), has 
played a more prominent role in development cooperation. 
The EP enjoys substantial powers in this field. Whilst the changes introduced in the Lisbon 
Treaty might seem, at first glance, to be only marginal, they are more significant than they 
appear (Delputte and Verschaeve 2015, 39). These powers are legislative, as the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’ applies in development cooperation, and budgetary. The EP has a critical 
role to play in the adoption of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the prime policy 
mechanism in this area that carries a budget of no less than EUR 19.6 billion for 2014-2020 
(European Parliament 2014, 16). But its role has been largely overlooked in the literature. 
Although there is no shortage of analysis of the EP’s global engagement (Wessel & Takács 
2017), much of the literature focusses on its involvement in CFSP/CSDP (Rosén and Raube 
2018), European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Kaminska 2017) and ‘headline-grabbing’ or 
‘high politics’ issues. The latter issues include relations with third countries, salient EU 
international agreements on data exchange (Eckes 2014) or more recently trade (such as the 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) (Roederer-Rynning 
2017) and the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Jančić 2017a; 
Meissner 2016)) and role in the Brexit process (Paper 6). The wide-ranging research on 
‘Normative Power Europe’ has generally not brought the European Parliament’s role to the 
fore (with some exceptions, including Birchfield 2011). Yet, even before the EP’s powers in 
development cooperation were increased via the introduction of the ordinary legislative 
procedure in the Treaty of Lisbon, this institution has quietly exerted its influence on both law 
and policy. A decades-long official of the European Commission and its former Director-
General for Development reveals how this influence was achieved:  
‘Parliament, which is a genuine protagonist of development cooperation policy, has 
always used all the resources that it has available to promote that policy. Without its 
political support, many Commission initiatives would have come to naught; 
Parliament has also drawn on its budget powers and has taken many initiatives to 
strengthen and even create budget lines to support its priorities’. (Frisch 2008, 50) 
This article explores the relationship between the EP and EU development cooperation. It 
argues that by having worked largely in the shadows, the Parliament has helped shape the 
governance of this area of EU external relations. On this basis, we argue that the ‘low politics’ 
of EU development cooperation is highly susceptible to the European Parliament’s institutional 
assertion and empowerment. We use ‘low politics’ to indicate development cooperation as a 
policy which does not attract high levels of scrutiny or public debate. By contrast, ‘high 
politics’ would be best represented by TTIP, migration policy, aspects of CFSP/CDSP and to 
some extent international environmental policy with a focus on the EU’s role in climate change 
agreements. We recognise that the ‘high/low politics’ distinction may be applied differently, 
such as to the budgetary amounts needed for policy implementation, and this would likely place 
development cooperation in the ‘high politics’ category. However, this would not change the 
nature of this policy as one that is scarcely politicised. 
The article employs a legal analysis to demonstrate the multiple channels of the evolution of 
the Parliament’s role in development cooperation. The inquiry goes beyond an analysis of 
Treaty provisions and addresses the means by which the Parliament has sought to exert 
influence. This influence has two dimensions: on the one hand, the search for greater coherence 
in EU external relations; and on the other, the search for an appropriate institutional balance in 
terms of democratic participation and tighter accountability for the decision-making outcomes. 
The article examines the use of the powers gained in the post-Lisbon era, both through the 
adoption of resolutions and political positions and through challenges to different aspects of 
development cooperation law and its overlap with other areas of EU competence before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
The analysis begins by examining the evolution and nature of EU development cooperation 
law and policy in order to demonstrate how they have shaped the EP’s competence within the 
Treaties (2). The article then traces the Parliament’s legal powers and its interinstitutional 
interactions in development cooperation. This part inquires whether the changes to its formal 
powers occurred because of its increasingly important informal role, or whether the 
Parliament’s formal empowerment spilt over to development, thus raising a ‘chicken and egg’ 
question (3).  Finally, the article considers the interface between the legal competences and the 
political developments since the Lisbon Treaty, particularly the Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) (2021-2027), the European Consensus on Development, and Parliament’s 
resolutions on development cooperation as a prism through which we can understand the nature 
and application of the Parliament’s post-Lisbon powers (4). 
 
The European Parliament and the search for competence in development cooperation 
Development cooperation has always been part of the European project. The Schuman 
Declaration referred to the development of Africa as an ‘essential task’, a provision now largely 
ignored (Heywood, 1981; Bartels 2008; Hansen and Jonsson 2011). Yet, it was only in the 
Treaty on European Union that a specific competence was devoted to development 
cooperation. Previously, development cooperation was only part of (but also subservient to) 
other areas, notably the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). Its evolution was intrinsically 
linked to the independence movements in former colonies in Africa and elsewhere (Broberg 
2011). 
The shared nature of development cooperation between the EU and its Member States is 
threaded through all Treaty articles where it is mentioned. The general principle, in Art 4(4) 
TFEU, states that the Union has competence in development cooperation and humanitarian aid, 
adding that ‘the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented 
from exercising theirs’.ii The special nature of development cooperation is also acknowledged 
in that the Treaty does not list it among the ‘principal areas’ of shared competence, such as the 
internal market and agriculture. Instead, along with research, technological development and 
space, development cooperation is carved out as what could be called a ‘non-principal’ area of 
shared competence. This apparent lower ranking of development cooperation contributes to its 
‘low politics’ status among the other policy areas of EU external relations.  
In the specific provisions (Articles 208-211 TFEU), we also find that the EU’s and the Member 
States’ competences shall ‘complement and reinforce each other’.iii Furthermore, although the 
Union’s right to conclude agreements with third countries and international organisations shall 
be ‘without prejudice’ to Member States’ own powers to do so,iv there is a requirement for the 
EU and the Member States to coordinate and consult on their respective policies on 
development cooperation and aid programmes.v And if this was not sufficient enough already, 
the final subsection reminds us that the EU and Member States shall cooperate with third 
countries and international organisations.vi This set of provisions can be contrasted with the 
preceding section on the CCP (Articles 206-207 TFEU), where the words ‘Member States’ 
appear only twice (though in the same sentence) and merely serve to prohibit harmonisation in 
areas not covered by the Treaty. Furthermore, while development cooperation is shared, CCP 
is an exclusive competence of the Union. The difference between these two major externally-
focussed EU policy areas is stark. The greater emphasis on Member States in development 
cooperation suggests that this policy is still considered as belonging to the ‘core state powers’ 
(Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013; Paper 6; Paper 10). Yet, while the important budgetary 
implications of development cooperation may cast this policy area as pertaining to core state 
powers, we argue that it remains within the realm of ‘low politics’ due to significantly lower 
degree of political contestation than in other areas of EU external relations. However, the fact 
that development cooperation has tangibly stronger participation of national institutions does 
not mean that the EU institutions necessarily have more limited competence. Rather, 
development cooperation has been subject to an incremental process of formal change. The 
Treaty of Lisbon in particular made two changes to the text and scope of the provisions. 
First, Article 209(1) TFEU introduced the ordinary legislative procedure into this area for the 
first time, enabling the EP to co-legislate with the Council. In this respect, even though 
development cooperation was already subject to co-decision under the previous Treaty regime, 
this change represents an affirmation of the Parliament’s institutional status. In terms of 
European integration, development cooperation has moved away from other spheres of the 
Treaty, most notably the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is generally 
characterised as a largely intergovernmental policy, with limited roles for the CJEU and 
Parliament (Cardwell 2013). Development cooperation has traditionally also been regarded as 
an area where Member States are reluctant to pool sovereignty, partly due to its foreign policy 
dimension, but also due to the large sums of money involved (Younas 2008). With this in mind, 
the incremental increase of the EP’s powers is remarkable and suggests a governance shift in 
this area. 
Second, the substantive scope of the Treaty provisions has also changed. Previously, the EC 
Treaty referred to fostering ‘sustainable economic and social development of the developing 
countries’, the integration of the developing countries into the world economy, and the 
campaign against poverty.vii Post-Lisbon, there is only a reference to the eradication of poverty 
as a primary objective of development cooperation.viii This difference is a consequence of a 
general push in the Lisbon negotiations for greater coherence in EU external action. As a result, 
development cooperation aims now fall within the general provisions on EU external action 
(Articles 21 and 22 TEU) which are designed to promote coherence between its externally-
focussed policies. Also, the EU and the EP are under an obligation promote values externally 
(Cardwell 2016; Jančić 2017b, 29). 
Although the discussion above focussed on explicit competences in development cooperation, 
the EU has long had the ability to enter into agreements with third countries which are largely 
developmental. The prime example is the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries. This agreement illustrates the crossover between policies on trade, 
development and even democracy promotion and human rights protection. The traditional 
exclusion of the EP from substantive powers in concluding agreements has gradually been 
eroded (Eeckhout 2011, 210). Furthermore, the Parliament has sought to exercise influence in 
diplomatic ways within interparliamentary forums, albeit often with limited political impact 
(Delputte 2012). However, ‘law’ is not merely constituted by the passing of legislation. Forms 
of ‘soft’ law, such as benchmarking and peer-review, have also been used since the 2000s 
(Gänzle, Makhan and Grimm 2012). While the EP is not generally a key actor in these types 
of instruments, they demonstrate a certain richness to the governance of development 
cooperation (as well as many other areas of European integration), albeit one which is beyond 
the scope of the present analysis. 
The role of the European Parliament in development cooperation therefore has a strong 
relationship with the search for coherence in EU external action, because the level of its 
involvement is contingent on the policy area and decision-making procedures concerned. 
Carbone (2008) has referred to this as ‘mission impossible’. The evolution of the EU as a 
specific type of non-state actor has exposed the fractures in attempting to separate different 
areas of legal competence and ‘actorness’ in an international system designed by, and for, 
nation states (Cremona 2008). This is a legal expression of the ‘who speaks for Europe?’ 
question. Importantly, questions of competences are not merely technical but have significant 
consequences for the way in which development cooperation and other policies operate in 
practice. Legislative and policy-making processes are differentiated according to the area(s) of 
the Treaty relied upon. This in turn also determines the degree of budgetary powers exercised 
by the institutions, including the Parliament. For certain Member States, the overlap of different 
areas can also risk conflicting with national positions and can thus prevent integration or 
cooperation on a range of areas of EU external action, in particular defence and security 
policies. Drawing a dividing line between what is ‘development cooperation’ and what is 
‘foreign policy’ is not a straightforward task, especially when, as is common, conditionality is 
applied in relationships with third countries. Although we often assume that in a national 
context ‘foreign policy’ is the preserve of the executive, the fact that development cooperation 
is wide and disposing of large financial resources has underlined the claim by the Parliament 
for greater involvement. 
 
Inter-institutional influence: ‘chicken and egg’? 
The argument made in this article is that the European Parliament has undergone incremental 
empowerment, thus increasing both its legal powers and its capacity for political influence over 
development cooperation. Far from being an institutional newcomer in development 
cooperation, the European Parliament has demonstrated a consistent interest in this policy area 
since the very establishment of the European Economic Community (European Parliament 
2011, 15; European Parliament 2010, 17-18).ix From a legal perspective, three dimensions help 
to support an assertion that the Parliament has successfully defended its interests and overcome 
opposition to having a greater role in this area. The first is reflected in the interinstitutional 
muscle-flexing over the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the 
second concerns the European Parliament’s recourse to the CJEU, and the third addresses the 
Parliament’s budgetary and oversight powers as its core prerogatives in development 
cooperation. 
 
Interinstitutional muscle-flexing 
Of the changes made in the Lisbon Treaty, the interinstitutional disputes about external 
relations were most controversial in development cooperation (Koutrakos 2012). Although 
primarily charged with diplomatic representation and provision of assistance to the EU High 
Representative in the shaping of CFSP and CSDP, the institutionalisation of the EEAS gave 
rise to significant claims-making of relevance to development policy too. This was for three 
key reasons: the tight nexuses that exist between development and foreign and security policies 
(Merket 2012; Furness and Gänzle 2017); the responsibilities that the EEAS has in the 
programming of the financing of development cooperation; and the uncertainties regarding the 
new Service’s remit, powers, and institutional make-up.  
Concretely, while the Commission was concerned about losing ‘turf’ to the EEAS if 
development cooperation was brought within its ambit, the European Parliament fought a 
twofold battle (Koutrakos 2012, 198). On the one hand, it sought to preserve the Community 
method of decision making in this policy area from intrusion by intergovernmental means of 
cooperation envisaged within the EEAS. On the other hand, it tried to impose democratic 
control over the Service’s budget and over the appointment of its Heads of Delegation. Notably, 
the Parliament’s influence on the EEAS negotiations is empirically traceable with the outcome 
resulting in a ‘compromise rather than consultation’ (Wisniewski 2013, 100). 
The EEAS saga could therefore be seen as an episode of ‘covert integration’ (Héritier 2013) 
through ‘micropolitics’ (Wiesner 2018), unravelling on the margins of the formal decision-
making processes. The Parliament’s resistance and assertion of rights has thickened the checks 
and balances between EU institutions. However, while the institutionalisation of the EEAS is 
well-documented in the literature, the Parliament’s utilisation of the judicial, budgetary and 
oversight routes to empowerment, to which we now turn, are far less so. 
 
Litigation before the CJEU 
Over a long period of time, dating back to the immediate aftermath of the Treaty on European 
Union (Treaty of Maastricht), when development cooperation policy became an EU 
competence, the Parliament has consistently and vigorously used its powers of referral to the 
CJEU to defend itself against any perceived side-lining by the other EU institutions. Against 
the background of multiple potential competences being engaged in the highly intertwined 
areas of development and trade, the case law exemplifies the direct impact that interinstitutional 
litigation has had on the discussion and position of the Parliament in relation to development. 
As will be shown, the Parliament’s efforts to gain prominence in development cooperation 
were an uphill struggle. 
First, in a classic case of institutional turf-war, the Parliament challenged the granting of 
‘special aid’ to Bangladesh in 1993.x Instead of using the Treaty provision which would have 
involved the Parliament as a budgetary actor, the act bypassed the EP by its adoption as ‘the 
Member States meeting in the Council’ (i.e. not the Council itself). The challenge was 
unsuccessful, with the Court recognising the wide powers enjoyed by the Member States in 
development cooperation. A similar outcome unfavourable to the Parliament was reached in 
the EDF case in 1994. The Parliament sought annulment of a financial regulation related to the 
implementation of the Lomé Convention, adopted pursuant to a procedure that excluded the 
Parliament. Despite the EP losing these cases, the latter show a clear, early parliamentary 
endeavour to ‘communautarise’ action in development cooperation (Van Vooren and Wessel 
2014, 322-323), with its budgetary power as the weapon. 
In a similar vein, in 1996 Portugal challenged an EU-India Cooperation Agreement on 
Partnership and Development, concluded on the joint basis of the CCP and development 
cooperation provisions. The crux of the argument was that the EU lacked the legal basis for 
some of the content of the agreement, including a human rights clause.xi The CJEU rejected 
the claims, finding that development cooperation provisions were a sufficient legal basis for 
the entire agreement. This wide judicial interpretation of development cooperation prevented 
individual Member States from blocking a development-related agreement, but at the same 
time risked reducing the European Parliament’s role since it was only to have been consulted.  
However, the Parliament has gradually found a friendly ear in the CJEU in cases where its role 
might be under threat. In a pre-Lisbon case of 2008, the Parliament brought an action against 
the Council to annul a decision concerning a guarantee granted to the European Investment 
Bank against losses under loans for projects outside the Community.xii In this case, the 
Parliament won the argument. The Commission, and the Council, acting on its proposal, should 
have relied on an additional legal basis that would have allowed the Parliament to be a co-
decider with the Council (under former Article 179 EC which referred to former Article 251 
EC), instead of it being merely consulted (under former Article 181a EC). The Parliament 
fought for its recognition as a co-equal decision-maker in development cooperation and 
successfully used its institutional prerogatives to question the choice of legal basis. This links 
to the preceding discussion of competence, and is evidence of the manner in which the 
Parliament has used one power (to bring actions before the CJEU) to enhance another (in 
development cooperation policy).  
Finally, the CJEU had the opportunity to clarify the post-Lisbon parameters of development 
cooperation in a case where the Commission challenged the Council concerning the 
Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the EU and the Philippines 
due to its multiple aims.xiii The judgment confirmed and even further extended the 
interpretation of competence in development cooperation policy (Broberg and Holdgaard 2015, 
563). Importantly, the risk of ‘the limitation of the institutional rights of the European 
Parliament’ was specifically argued before the Court.xiv This illustrates the awareness of the 
former’s growing role in this policy area and the latter’s willingness to confirm this within the 
specific institutional setup of this policy area. The judicial route to empowerment thus 
eventually proved beneficial to the EP’s institutional affirmation in the area of development 
cooperation. 
 
Budgetary and oversight powers 
The European Parliament exercises considerable influence in development cooperation 
through its budgetary power. Although this power remains limited (Benedetto, this issue), the 
Parliament uses three key mechanisms of involvement. 
First, the Parliament’s vote on the Union’s external financing instruments within the EU budget 
includes development-related components. Both the EU’s annual budget and the Multiannual 
Financial Framework are adopted via the special legislative procedure.xv The annual budget is 
decided by the Council after consulting the Parliament, while the MFF provides for co-decision 
which immediately moves to conciliation if the Parliament amends the Council’s text. 
Second, the specific financing of development cooperation flows from national, supranational 
and intergovernmental sources. The supranational funding (from the budget described above) 
is implemented through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).xvi The DCI, 
established in 2007, is adopted by a Regulation under the ordinary legislative procedure, thus 
enabling the EP to exercise full legislative power. This Instrument is divided into geographic 
and thematic programmes, including (since 2014) the ‘Pan-African’ programme. 
Intergovernmental funding comes directly from Member States, whose resources are pooled 
into the European Development Fund (EDF). The EDF, established in 1959, is adopted by an 
international agreement and focuses on implementing the EU’s financial duties towards the 
ACP countries under the Cotonou Agreement. This Fund does not form part of the EU budget 
and only partially uses the Union’s institutional framework. The EDF is a sui generis 
international agreement, because it is an ‘internal agreement’ concluded by Member State 
representatives meeting within the Council, after consulting the Commission and the European 
Investment Bank, but not the Parliament. Contrary to EU-third country international 
agreements, which require the Parliament’s consent, the EDF agreements do not. Other than 
granting discharge for the financial management of the Fund, the EP has no influence over the 
Fund’s expenditure. These differences between the sources of development funding crucially 
determine the level of the Parliament’s participation in and impact on development cooperation 
budgeting. However, the separate regimes of the DCI and the EDF are likely to change with 
the new MFF (2021-2027), the proposals for which foresee the integration of the EDF into the 
EU budget.xvii 
Third, the Parliament possesses a number of significant rights of democratic oversight, which 
concern comitology legislation, reporting duties, strategic dialogue and budgetary discharge. 
The Parliament may use its prerogatives under the comitology procedures to oppose the 
Commission’s legislation that aims to implement EU development cooperation law.xviii Any 
such opposition, however, only obliges the Commission to review its action but not necessarily 
to abandon it, because the latter may decide to amend it or maintain it unamended. In political 
practice, the value of this right lies in enabling MEPs to scrutinise the aforesaid Strategy Papers 
or Annual Action Programmes, which they have engaged in with limited success because its 
opinions are not binding on the Commission (Van Seters and Wolff 2010, 23-24). 
Furthermore, there is a general duty referring to all external action financing that obliges the 
Commission to provide the Parliament with an annual report and evaluation reports.xix More 
specifically, pursuant to a 2013 interinstitutional agreement, the Commission and Parliament 
have an informal dialogue on all issues of development cooperation policy regardless of their 
source, encompassing both those flowing from the DCI and the EDF. This voluntary 
equalization of the treatment of the EDF enhances Parliament’s access to information and its 
ability to scrutinize effectively. As an undertaking that favours both institutions and with a 
view to ‘enhancing the democratic scrutiny of development policy’,xx the Commission also 
expressed its intention to propose the incorporation of the EDF under the EU budget, an 
intention which, as mentioned above, it realised in proposals for the new multiannual budget. 
The proposal for a new interinstitutional agreement that will accompany the MFF (2021-2027) 
continues this informal dialogue. 
In 2014, a little over three months after the interinstitutional agreement was signed, the second 
DCI (2014-2020), unlike the first, included a Commission Declaration on the strategic dialogue 
with the Parliament.xxi This arrangement provides for wide-ranging discussions between the 
two EU institutions prior to the programming of the DCI, after the initial consultations with 
relevant beneficiaries, and during preparation for mid-term review of the DCI. The 
Commission also undertook to explain its positions before the Parliament, if invited. Similarly, 
the Parliament now holds hearings for Commission candidates. As an increasingly politicised 
process, it led to the standing down of Rumiana Jeleva, a Bulgarian candidate for the post of 
Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response in 
2010.xxii 
The budgetary discharge procedure constitutes a further instrument of ex post accountability 
and provides an opportunity to hold the Commission to account by examining its accounts and 
deciding whether to grant discharge for the preceding financial year. The Parliament also 
exercises control over EU development cooperation expenditure through actions before the 
CJEU. For instance, in 2007 the Parliament was successful in effecting the annulment of a 
Commission Decision which had approved a project aimed at curbing terrorism and 
international crime in the Philippines, but which was based on a regulation concerning financial 
and technical cooperation with Asian and African countries.xxiii 
To exercise the said budgetary and oversight powers, the EP requires adequate internal 
institutional capacity. In this sense, the Parliament’s scrutiny of development cooperation 
policy is concentrated in the Committee on Development (DEVE).xxiv Besides taking the lead 
in interinstitutional legislative and budgetary negotiations, this committee oversees the 
Commission, EEAS and recipients of EU funds, and evaluates the effectiveness of EU aid 
programmes. It provides opinions to the Committee for Budgetary Control during the annual 
budgetary discharge process. A notable task of the committee is to assess the relationship and 
coherence between national and EU policies. This task is indeed of great importance: according 
to a 2013 study, better coordination between EU donors could have brought about total savings 
of some €9.2 billion, amounting to 16.4% of EU development aid.xxv Externally, the committee 
members engage in bilateral and multilateral political dialogues with developing countries, 
including within international interparliamentary forums.  
Taken together, the Parliament has gradually succeeded in exerting significant influence using 
a variety of tools at its disposal. As the only directly elected EU institution, it has reinforced 
democratic participation in the decision-making processes in development cooperation. The 
following section builds on this finding by examining how, on the basis of its legal 
empowerment, it has been able to place itself at the heart of the main political developments in 
this policy area. 
 
Political developments 
This section considers three aspects of the interface between legal competences, as examined 
above, and what are termed ‘political developments’. These are the novelties brought about by 
the proposals for the multiannual budget for the period 2021-2027; the conclusion of the 
European Consensus on Development; and the resolutions of the European Parliament on 
development cooperation issues. 
 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027 
The implications for the European Parliament of the new MFF proposals published in May 
2018 are significant. While parliamentary control over the EDF had already increased 
informally, its integration in the EU budget under the new MFF will represent a legal 
formalisation of this evolution. A corollary of this is that the regular budgetary powers of the 
Parliament will become applicable as a matter of law rather than as a matter of a political 
undertaking. 
The new MFF proposals also envisage a restructuring of the financing instruments. The DCI 
will be subsumed under a single broader Neighbourhood, Development and International 
Cooperation Instrument with worldwide coverage. This, however, is unlikely adversely to 
affect the Parliament because the MFF proposals foresee an increase in the budget 
commitments for development cooperation. This makes democratic oversight even more 
necessary and the Parliament’s vote of approval even more weighty. To wit, of some €108.9 
billion for the ‘Neighbourhood and the World’ budget, some €79.2 billion would go to the new 
unified Instrument, a figure roughly the same as the nominal GDPs of Estonia and Croatia 
combined (IMF estimate for 2018). This increase, however, goes hand in hand with the 
increases in commitments in other policy areas. 
 
European Consensus on Development 
The first European Consensus on Development was a joint statement adopted by the 
Parliament, Council and Commission on 20 December 2005. It stated that human rights and 
democracy are preconditions for development and that such development must be sustainable. 
The Consensus was the successor to a 1991 Council Resolution (Leino 2008, 279) and the 
Parliament’s own resolution of 2000, which called for the adoption of strategies on the 
coherence of development with other policies and annual progress reports.xxvi The Consensus 
was adopted soon after an inter-institutional agreement between the Parliament and 
Commission, which set out an enhanced role for the former in the process of negotiating 
international agreements by the Community: the Parliament was able to express its views, 
which were to be taken into account ‘as far as possible’ (Thym 2008, 205). A similar consensus 
on humanitarian aid followed in 2008. 
The rationale for such agreements between institutions is to ‘ensure the discussion, adoption 
and implementation of common approach, positions and operational action’ (Cremona 2011, 
75) due to, or perhaps in spite of, the fragmented Treaty landscape and problematic search for 
coherence (Carbone and Keijzer 2013). Although they are not legally enforceable, the language 
employed is ‘couched in binding terms’ (Cremona 2011, 75). The Consensus is a prime 
example of this approach. 
Moreover, the revision of the European Consensus on Development, carried out in 2017, was 
an opportunity for the politicisation of the development cooperation policy. While the new 
Consensus was adopted thanks to the votes of support by the two largest political groups in the 
Parliament (the EPP and S&D), the smaller groups of ALDE, Greens, GUE/NGL and EFDD 
tabled their own resolution rejecting the Consensus. The latter’s main criticism was that 
excessive emphasis was being placed on migration, because this could, they argued, divert 
attention away from the goal of poverty elimination towards achieving the Union’s own self-
interest in the area of security.xxvii Albeit the latter resolution was unsuccessful, it exposed the 
proposed philosophy of EU development cooperation policy to public scrutiny. Both 
resolutions, however, used the occasion to call for accountability mechanisms to be put in place 
for monitoring the attainment of the 0.7% GNI target for the Union’s collective commitment 
to development assistance during the timeframe of the UN’s 2030 Agenda, not least through 
annual reporting to the Parliament.xxviii  
If contrasted with the exclusion of the Parliament from the first major EU document outlining 
policy objectives and strategies of development cooperation (Delputte and Verschaeve 2015, 
38), the evolution driven by the European Consensus on Development is pertinent. The 
European Parliament’s involvement in the crafting of the Consensus underlines its engagement 
as a strategic player, actively participating in the charting of the future trajectory of EU 
development cooperation rather than merely reacting ex post. It is also a recognition of the 
Parliament’s institutional standing as a key interlocutor contributing to a unified EU vision for 
development policy in line with the global agenda focused on achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals under the 2030 Agenda. 
 
Resolutions on development cooperation 
As transpires from the foregoing, the European Parliament is a pro-active participant in EU 
development policy making, and to this end it frequently adopts resolutions, which carry 
political weight without being legally binding. 
The Parliament frequently uses resolutions to pressure other EU institutions, above all the 
Commission, to commit to tougher scrutiny and accept more stringent oversight. For example, 
in its review of the UN’s 2030 Agenda, MEPs urged the Commission to develop ‘effective 
monitoring, review and accountability mechanisms’ for the Agenda’s implementation and to 
regularly report to the Parliament, concomitantly highlighting the need for an increased 
parliamentary scrutiny, potentially through ‘a binding interinstitutional agreement’ via Article 
295 TFEU.xxix A similar request for an interinstitutional agreement on transparency, 
accountability and parliamentary scrutiny was issued in April 2018 with respect to the post-
2020 architecture of the DCI and the EDF.xxx The Parliament’s insistence on greater 
information sharing and improved monitoring arrangements is not only directed at the 
Commission, however, but also at the international actors and initiatives, such as the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.xxxi Concerning the DCI, the Parliament 
has also expressed dissatisfaction with the ‘very short deadline’ left to it for scrutiny of draft 
DCI implementing measures and called upon the Commission to amend the DCI Rules of 
Procedure by the end of 2018 to allow more time for this type of oversight.xxxii 
A further instrument at the disposal of the Parliament is budgetary discharge resolutions. 
Whereas these to a great extent rely on data provided by the Court of Auditors, MEPs regularly 
use them to highlight errors in the Commission’s management of development finances, and 
assess the performance and control frameworks of the latter’s Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO).xxxiii 
Such parliamentary pronouncements are not a guarantee of influence. For example, the 
aforementioned resolution on the 2030 Agenda shows that the DEVE Committee’s request for 
the Commission to publish a communication to serve as a basis for the common EU position 
ahead of the relevant meeting of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development 
had fallen on deaf ears.xxxiv On a later occasion, the Parliament regretted gaps in reporting.xxxv 
Nevertheless, these considerations are testimony to the swings and roundabouts of the political 
process, where the nature of much of the outcomes depends on mutual concessions, party 
politics, and the relative institutional power. What is important for the analysis here is that in 
each instance, the Parliament has demonstrated that it is a ‘player’ in development cooperation 
that cannot be ignored and will flex its institutional muscles through both judicial, legislative 
and democratic control mechanisms where necessary. In this respect, the law and the politics 
of development cooperation operate in parallel to reinforce the Parliament’s voice in decision 
making. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has made the case that development cooperation is an instructive way of 
understanding how the EP has incrementally increased its powers in an important, but not 
highly politicised, area of European integration. By employing the different means at its 
disposal, including competence-related litigation before the CJEU and the maximisation of its 
institutional pronouncement via budgetary powers, the EP has gained both a stronger formal 
legal-institutional position and more palpable political influence owing to its greater informal 
involvement in interinstitutional bargaining. 
However, whilst this paints an optimistic picture of development cooperation as a forum where 
the EU’s only democratically elected institution has used a foothold to wield both power and 
influence, a note of caution is required. First, although its legal-institutional position has 
changed over time, it can only fully be regarded as successful if visible effects can be seen on 
the policy area itself. Understanding the outcomes of EU development cooperation if the EP 
was not involved requires a much deeper examination of the substance, which is beyond the 
scope of the present analysis. Taking this point further, development cooperation represents an 
instance of ‘soft’ Europeanisation, where there has been a move beyond information-sharing 
towards strategy-building, but with few visible results in terms of how this has impacted on the 
Member States (Orbie and Lightfoot 2017, 2004). Therefore, understanding what, if any, policy 
influence the EP has exerted as merely one actor within the EU institutional framework merits 
further exploration (Paper 6). Although the Treaty of Lisbon is approaching its first decade in 
force, the institutional challenges emerging from the Treaty, including the Parliament’s role, 
the establishment of the EEAS, and the search for policy coherence, are only starting to be 
resolved. 
The foregoing analysis documents the variety of changes experienced by the European 
Parliament. Our findings nuance the view of Delputte and Verschaeve (2015, 36) that ‘in 
contrast to the Maastricht Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty did not substantially alter the competences 
of the EP in development cooperation, suggesting continuity rather than change’. While we 
agree that this is correct, our analysis also indicates that Parliament has utilised informal 
channels to raise its profile among other EU institutions. This, however, often took place with 
the blessing of the Commission, because the latter saw the Council and the Member States as 
the key institutional opponent. Therefore, the ‘low politics’ nature of development cooperation 
has in fact facilitated the Parliament’s raised profile. This positive institutional development, 
however, does not guarantee actual influence on the policy outcomes; rather, it increases the 
potential for the Parliament to exercise its powers, for it to be asked for opinion, for other EU 
institutions to be more alert to the Parliament’s arguments, and for these arguments to alter 
political practices as vectors of broader institutional changes benefitting the Parliament. 
Yet there is little doubt that development cooperation has not merely been used as a testing 
ground for increasing either the Parliament’s power or its influence. To suggest this would 
undermine the genuine interest of the Parliament and its Members over a long period in 
ensuring the attainment of the goals of development cooperation and in fulfilling their 
democratic mandate of overseeing the use of a significant part of the EU budget.  
Finally, although we characterised development cooperation as ‘low politics’, because of the 
comparatively lower amount of public salience when set against other external policies, the 
search for coherence indicates that development cooperation is not necessarily destined to 
remain in the realm of ‘low politics’. On the one hand, this is because of the frictions and 
interinstitutional disputes that may arise in the Union’s pursuit of such coherence, especially 
where the Parliament adopts approaches and attitudes that fundamentally diverge from those 
of the other EU institutions. On the other hand, the rising salience of migration may put 
development cooperation much more markedly on the EU agenda as an important tool for its 
containment. 
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